We are left with two relevant questions:
• Why were the forecasts so greatly in error?
• What drove the very rapid increase in China's energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in the period after 2001?
This review will seek to answer these questions in four sections. The next section describes the data on China's energy-related carbon emissions within a global context.
The third section evaluates China carbon-emissions forecasts from leading international and Chinese organizations. The fourth section looks at recent China carbon emissions drivers to understand the roots of forecast errors. Section five examines current and historical emissions reduction policies, and the conclusion will discuss implications from this review. China's population is more than four times larger than the United States, it is responsible for less than one third the cumulative carbon emissions. 
CHINA'S CARBON EMISSIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

Global Carbon Emissions Trends
Estimates of China's historical carbon emissions
EMISSIONS FORECAST ASSESSMENTS
For this analysis we use World Energy Outlook (International Energy Agency), the International Energy Outlook (U.S. Department of Energy) and three highly respected sources in China. It is fair to note that some of the differences in the forecasts are due to changes in the baseline energy data, which are not attributable to the model. Note: forecasts are displayed as linearly continuous on the basis of published periodic data.
International Forecasts
Chinese Forecasts
The interesting issue arises of whether the Chinese have done a better job at projecting their emissions than foreigners. Figure 8 shows three published forecasts in China at the time they were made. They were performed respectively by a team at Tsinghua 
CHINA EMISSIONS DRIVERS: ROOTS OF FORECAST ERROR
Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions do not consistently correlate with aggregate GDP or population growth. 
Economic Reform and Carbon Intensity of GDP
Market reforms have altered China's economic structure, energy use, and carbon emissions. The gradual elimination of state-directed capital allocation allows investment to cluster in profit-maximizing sectors, thereby stimulating economic growth and energy usage. However, whereas forecasters predicted that "reductions in energy and carbon intensities will occur regardless of capital market reforms and privatization," China's carbon and energy intensity of GDP increased between 2002 and 2005 (12) . Figure 10 shows the anomalous bounce of China's carbon intensity of GDP after more than twenty years of steady decline. In order to differentiate efficiency and structural drivers of energy and carbon intensity change, the Laspeyres decomposition method has been used to quantify aggregate effects.
This method indicates that declines of energy and carbon intensity of GDP during the 1980's and 1990's were largely due to improved industrial efficiency (13, 14) . However, energy efficiency improvements were overtaken by structural shifts to heavy industry such as cement and steel production between 2002 and 2005 (15) . Heavy industrialization is a common explanation for the above-one carbon elasticity of GDP illustrated in Figure 11 . 
Fuel Mix and Energy Supply
China's fossil fuel reserves are completely dominated by coal. Estimates of recoverable coal reserves vary between 115 and 333 billion tons of raw coal (26) . Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of China's fossil fuel reserve base according to NBS data published in 2007 (27). Perhaps as a result of coal's prevalence in China, the ratio of total primary energy supply to total final energy consumption is higher in China than other less-coal-dependent countries (28). 
Trade
The opening and reform of China's economy has resulted in rapid growth of external By converting export revenue data to value-added terms, economists have estimated that 10% of China's GDP can be traced to exports (30, 31) . The dollar value of exports has also been used to estimate the carbon embodiment of Chinese exports (32) . On the basis of carbon intensities and trade data, the IEA has estimated that the energy-related CO 2 emissions embedded in China's domestic production for exports accounted for 34% of While it is difficult to generate reliable estimates of Chinese carbon embodiments, the rapid growth of trade in highly carbon-intensive goods and commodities points to a larger question of emissions accounting. Under the current producer-oriented system of carbon emissions accounting, there is an inherent conflict between national CO 2 emissions targets and the aim of improving foreign trade balances (37) . Switching to a consumption-oriented carbon accounting methodology would change national incentives and carbon-emissions estimates (38) . This is an area of continuing research, but for the time being it is clear that international trade is playing a significant role in China's energy-related carbon dioxide emissions.
Whereas GDP and population growth are often used to forecast energy-related carbon emissions, this review shows that recent trends can be traced to structural change in the Chinese economy with increasing output of energy-intensive industry, ongoing urbanization, increased carbon intensity of energy usage, and rapidly expanding international trade. None of these factors alone account for carbon emissions growth;
rather their separate influences underscore the complexity of historical and forecasted energy-related carbon emissions in China. In the early days of the Peoples Republic, industry was modeled after the Soviet approach.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES LEADING TO REDUCED GROWTH
This meant that energy was priced very low, so that it was available especially to support the development of heavy industry. The result was that energy demand grew substantially faster than economic growth, in some years twice as fast. One cannot be certain how much of this decline in intensity was due to policies, but it had to be a great deal. In 1980, the government of China called for GNP to quadruple from 1980 to 2000 while energy demand only doubled. Thus, the declining E/GNP ratio was a goal of a government that had substantial control over its economy.
In 1981, the first year of the Sixth 5-Year Plan, China increased state investment in energy conservation from essentially zero to 10% of all energy-related investment. To carry out these investments, the China Energy Conservation Investment Corporation was created, with local offices throughout China.
A national network of energy conservation technology service centers was set up, with trained personnel to assist industry in energy efficiency. The first was created in 1983.
By 1995, there were more than 200 of these centers throughout the nation employing 7,000 staff.
A third area was energy management in industry. This included requirements for energy monitoring, establishment of energy efficiency requirements for equipment, and the imposition of energy quotas. The latter, while possible under a controlled economy, was eventually dismantled in the middle and late 1990s.
Eleventh Five-Year Plan Energy Intensity Reduction Targets
We have observed that in 2001 -2005, energy demand in China grew faster than GDP which itself was growing at a very rapid rate. This has led to a serious situation in China, with very high levels of investment going to power plants (and not to other uses) and contributing to major concerns about China's environment. The country has found itself at a place similar to where it was in the late 1970s. It has responded in a similar way. But there are significant differences between 1980 and today. China has moved a good deal of the way to a market economy. The top 1,000 Program (explained further in Section 5.3) is in many ways an effort to reinstitute the old energy quota system for industry. This may be possible for state-owned enterprises; it is much harder to envision for private companies. China's energy data system has been allowed to deteriorate, and it will need to be very good if energy performance is graded and the grades matter.
Achieving reductions in energy (and CO 2 ) growth also requires a shift from highly energy-intensive to less energy-intensive industry. There was once a time when the government of China could make that happen; that time is no longer. And, perhaps most importantly, making money matters to many people in present-day China; policies that conflict with that goal are particularly difficult to put into practice.
In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese government is determined to advance its goal of declining energy intensity. While there is some debate on the efficacy of intensity targets in achieving emissions reductions targets, one does not wish to underestimate the ability of the government to achieve large goals through governmental programs or simply through exhortation at work and play (43).
Top-1,000 Enterprise Program
As a major part of its energy intensity reduction program, China has initiated a new However, an important difference now is the relatively softer role of the government, which has less authority and ability to enforce requirements than it had in the past. At the same time, the government has used encouragement (in the form of low interest loans) and pressure (in the form of evaluations in which responsible individuals will be assessed on an annual basis regarding achievement of energy intensity goals). As an example, 
Appliance Standards
China's modern standards and labeling programs have been in effect for less than a decade, but the impact is already beginning to be felt in terms of energy savings. In a rapidly growing economy like China's, energy savings serve more to bring down the rate of demand growth rather than to reduce consumption. Nonetheless, these efficiency programs have resulted in a lower amount of emissions of CO 2 , NO x , SO x and particulate matter than would have otherwise occurred if the programs had not been developed.
Moreover, they have saved Chinese consumers a lot of money.
In total, the programs currently in place are expected to save a cumulative 1143 TWh by 2020, or 9% of the cumulative consumption of residential electricity to that year. In 2020 alone, annual savings are expected to be equivalent to 11% of residential electricity use.
In average generation terms, this is equivalent to 27 1-GW coal fired plants that would have required around 75 million tonnes of coal to operate. In comparison, savings from the US appliance standards program is expected to save 10% of residential electricity consumption in 2020. Given the dominance of coal-fired electricity generation in China, appliance standards and labeling programs also help to mitigate air-pollution problems.
Between 2000 and 2020, improved efficiency among electric appliances and gas water heaters will reduce carbon emissions by more than 1.1 billion tons carbon dioxide. 
CONCLUSIONS
None of the major forecasts were able to pick up the dramatic increase in energy-related China. This in turn is the result of the demand for such products as iron and steel and concrete for construction of buildings, roads, and other infrastructure. China is at a place in its development when it can afford to build this infrastructure, when the government restrictions are largely removed, and when a newly open market economy permits individuals and companies to gain substantial profits from these opportunities.
All of this suggests that predicting China's growth in energy demand and related carbon dioxide emissions will be precarious in the coming decades. We identify two major unknowns that, in our view, will play a major role in the outcome. The first is policy.
The goal of 20% intensity reduction over five years will not be a one-time goal. China can be expected to pursue such policies into the indefinite future. Some of the intensity reduction (as we have seen) can be achieved with energy efficiency. Some of it will require structural change to a mix of less energy-intensive industries. The second major unknown goes deeper into drivers of demand. At what point will China have enough building space for its people -or at least enough for construction activity to diminish?
When will there be enough roadways, rail lines, automobiles, buses, trains, trucks (and in what mix) to support personal and freight transport?
All of this -along with the factors in the first paragraph of this section -needs to be overlaid onto the projected economic growth of China to gain an understanding of the major drivers of CO2 emissions in China.
In light of the difficulties that have emerged for those forecasting CO2 emissions in China, it is not surprising that China would be especially loath to submit to a fixed target.
Their own CO2 forecasts have failed to capture the dramatic growth of CO2 emissions in the past five years. Those from outside China have been inadequate to the task. The forecasts for industrialized countries on the other hand have been much more robust.
How does this relate to the most recent IEA projections that, in the base case, China is expected to account for 42% of incremental global energy-related CO2 emissions -and about 50% in both higher and lower scenarios? The problem with these emissions forecasts, in the view of the authors, is that they assume the China will follow the world and have a base (low or high) growth case if the rest of the world follows these respective cases. As we have seen, policy in China will play an important role in future emissions.
It is entirely possible for China to cut the growth rate of emissions (relative to GDP) while other countries do not. Unfortunately, it is impossible to predict such an outcome with any degree of confidence, as the degree to which China can tame its burgeoning energy demand is not at all clear.
Considering the energy sources available to China, very heavy reliance on coal can be expected for decades. This in spite of the desire that China has often expressed to diversify energy sources away from coal. CO2 emissions could, however, be affected dramatically if carbon capture and storage becomes affordable (with a carbon tax) or if significant breakthroughs in renewable or nuclear power costs occur. The authors do not expect either to occur in the coming decades in a magnitude that will impact overall energy-related CO2 emissions from China. 
SUMMARY POINTS
FUTURE ISSUES
1. For short-term modeling, it is critical to understand the factors that have led to the rapid growth of heavy industry in spite of the government support for light industry. This is a very complex area for research to which little attention has been devoted.
2. Comprehensive, physically-based energy-intensity analysis must be performed to understand the role of trade and export-oriented industries in China's emissions growth.
3. For personal transportation, it will be important to understand the degree to which congestion may (or may not) limit the use of automobiles, as well as the aggressiveness (or lack thereof) of government in providing public transit alternatives.
4. The role of increasing urbanization will have considerable influence on China's CO2 emissions. Research is needed to understand the implications of different patterns of urban growth on energy and carbon dioxide emissions.
5. In the longer term, the saturation of energy-using equipment, efficiency of the equipment, lifestyles of the Chinese, and the overall needs for infrastructure (buildings, highways, rail, etc.), and population will establish energy demand.
Research is needed to understand the types of Chinese social and economic organization consistent with different values of these determinants of energy demand.
6. Research is needed to understand the opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions through alternatives to coal as a source of energy supply in the longer term.
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, and DEFINITIONS
Carbon elasticity: the ratio of energy-related carbon emissions growth to GDP growth.
Carbon intensity: the amount of energy-related carbon emissions per unit GDP.
Energy intensity: the amount of energy consumed per unit GDP. 
IPCC:
